Neuromorphic computing endeavors to imitate the way biological brains process information and solve problems. Uses for neuromorphic computing span disciplines and include applications in image processing, audio processing, optimization, and more. This work explores the effect of proton-induced singleevent upsets (SEUs) on a neuromorphic computing architecture engaged in image recognition. Two main results are found. One, the overall classification accuracy is unchanged although a high number of hidden, tolerable errors occurred. Additionally, SEUs are found to alter the relative occurrence of false positives and false negatives, which occurred despite the overall classification accuracy remaining unaffected. Index Terms-Classification changes, modified national institute of standards and technology (MNIST), neuromorphic computing, proton irradiation, single-event effects (SEEs), singleevent upsets (SEUs), TrueNorth neurosynaptic system.
I. INTRODUCTION
N EUROMORPHIC computing is brain-inspired, nonvon Neumann computing. The goal of neuromorphic computing is to emulate the way the brain approaches complex problems, such as pattern recognition. There are a variety of applications for neuromorphic computing including signal processing, high-performance computing, text and audio processing, learning and optimization among others [1] . Interest in specialized hardware implementations to accelerate these computations has increased recently. Several companies including IBM, Intel, Qualcomm, and Nvidia have produced specialized hardware solutions implementing neuromorphic computing architectures in digital CMOS. These early Manuscript generation products will ideally evolve into highly integrated, 3-D, nonvolatile technologies. In a similar manner to neural networks (NNs), neuromorphic architectures are densely interconnected with each output sharing large portions of the same input space as inputs from several neurons. Consequently, the architecture possesses increased redundancy compared to traditional computing architectures and can be fault tolerant if specifically designed that way, but comes at a computational cost [2] - [5] . The way neuromorphic computers "learn" is through the use of self-tuning weights. Since the memory and computing components of the chip are not physically separated, as is the case in traditional computing, the architecture is nonvon Neumann. As a result, neuromorphic architectures have increased redundancy and a reduction in the memory bandwidth bottleneck compared to traditional computing architectures [2] . While research is limited on how single events affect the relatively new architectures, studies have previously been conducted on realizations in commercial off the shelf (COTs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), graphic processing units (GPUs), and software frameworks [3] , [5] - [7] . Several works in the literature analyze errors in NNs through fault injection simulations [3] , [4] , [6] - [9] , radiation tests [3] , [6] - [8] , and pulsed-laser tests [10] . This work analyzes the effects of radiation on a neuromorphic computing architecture. Fault injection simulations were conducted in [8] based on the same architecture as this work.
This work uses image classification accuracy to gauge the effects of radiation in a neuromorphic computing architecture. With proton irradiation of a neuromorphic chip, we observed nearly unaffected overall classification accuracy, but offsetting trends in false positives and negatives in the recognition of individual image classes. This metric of image classification accuracy provides further insight into the radiation response.
II. BACKGROUND
Artificial NNs are claimed to be intrinsically fault tolerant; however, most artificial NNs cannot be considered fault tolerant without a proper design. Passive fault tolerance 0018-9499 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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can be achieved through redundancy or modifying learning. Including faults during training promotes better generalization than other limited solutions, but there is a higher computational cost and training takes longer. Active fault tolerance such as resetting the NN to a faultless state after a fault occurs and propagates is most widely used to design fault-tolerant NNs in hardware [4] , [5] . Fault injection simulations and radiation tests have been conducted on FPGAs and GPUs among others. In simulations on an FPGA in [3] , it was shown that faults in the NN did not necessarily result in an error in the output. As such, faults that do not affect the output are called tolerable errors, hidden errors, or silent data corruption, while faults impacting the output are called critical errors. Additionally using fault injection in an FPGA, [7] showed that faults injected close to the input layers of the NN had a more significant effect on the output than upsets in later layers. It was found in [6] that a single fault in a GPU tends to spread through multiple threads, and, therefore, it is important to be able to detect and correct errors in critical applications. Finally, [4] shows that deep NN resistance to errors is dependent on a number of factors including the data itself in addition to the types of layers in the NN design.
In prior work, an static random access memory (SRAM)based artificial NN tasked with image recognition was hit with a pulsed laser to generate SEUs [10] . The beam was focused on cells in the SRAM that contained weights and thresholds for the artificial NN. In most cases, the image recognition rate did not change, indicating that the errors did not affect the output. In the cases that the recognition rate did change, it was improved in some cases and diminished in others. The experiments with the pulsed laser affected artificial NN performance in a manner that error injection through software simulation could not [10] .
III. HARDWARE
The particular hardware studied in this work was IBM's TrueNorth Neurosynaptic System fabricated in Samsung's 28-nm low power (LP) process ( Fig. 1 ). It is programmable and executes trained "corelets," which are TrueNorth programs uploaded to the board via a host computer. The chip implements a spontaneously spiking neural network (SNN), meaning that the output spikes are not governed by a global clock. The neurons in the SNN integrate the input spikes and add to the membrane potential. This potential takes into account the weights of the neurons, and the potential decreases as a function of time, causing newer events to have more effect than older ones. When the membrane potential surpasses the predetermined threshold, the output neuron fires a spike into the network. In addition, the SNN in the TrueNorth chip also includes leakage from the potential to emulate "forgetting" [11] . Therefore, older events have less of an effect on the neural potential than more recent events [12] .
The chip was designed to be power efficient. The power efficiency is due mainly to local, distributed memory that limits the distance on the chip that spikes must travel. TrueNorth also uses an event-driven architecture, the SNN, therefore, components only have to be "on" and consuming power when prompted by an event. The lack of a global clock network also contributes to the power efficiency of the chip [11] .
TrueNorth is scalable and fault tolerant. Up to 16 TrueNorth chips can be physically connected, and the software is already designed to allow communication among the various chips. In addition, the high connectivity between neurons, cores, and chips creates redundancy. A result of the interconnectedness is increased fault tolerance via avoidance of defective cores and the implementation of memory redundancies [11] .
The physical arrangement of one TrueNorth chip is a 64 by 64 array of cores (4096 total cores) covering an area of 4.3 cm 2 including a total of 428 Mb of SRAM [11] , [13] . A schematic of one core is shown in Fig. 2 . The chip is fabricated in a 28-nm CMOS technology, and the memory (which composes approximately 30% of the area of the chip) is SRAM. The total amount of SRAM per core is approximately 107 kb [13] . The data stored in the SRAM include storing neuron data, weights, thresholds, and neuron magnitudes (see [1] , [8] , [11] , [13] for additional information).
The packaging of the TrueNorth chip includes 1.2-mm molding compound above the chip, as shown in Fig. 3 . Below the molding compound, approximately 10 µm of metallization, dielectric, and via layers exist above the active region. Fig. 4 shows a sketch of the back end of line (not to scale). These metallization layers are composed of various metals including aluminum, tungsten, and copper.
IV. TRUENORTH OPERATION
The operation of the TrueNorth board was accomplished through the use of trained corelets. The particular corelet used for these experiments came pretrained and the training was conducted based on an IBM model file. The corelet classified handwritten digits 0 through 9 where the digits came from the modified national institute of standards and technology (MNIST) database. The MNIST database is a collection of images of handwritten digits between 0 and 9. Of the 70 000 digits in the database, there are 60 000 digit images for the training data set and 10 000 for classification. Of the 10 000 digits used for classification, there are approximately 1000 samples of each digit [14] .
The classification of a digit is accomplished through the use of output neuron magnitudes. For every input image, the system assigns 10 output neuron magnitude values. These 10 output neuron magnitudes ranging from 0 to 1 inclusive correspond to the digits 0 through 9. The output neuron magnitude can be thought of as the likelihood of a particular digit being the correct classification of the image. (Note, however, that the sum of all output neurons is not required to add up to one like independent probabilities.) The output classification is chosen by selecting the digit with the highest output neuron magnitude.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Vanderbilt's Pelletron is an electrostatic particle accelerator primarily used to conduct radiation testing on electronic devices. The primary particles that can be accelerated are protons, alpha particles, oxygen ions, and chlorine ions. There are electrical feed-throughs to allow for testing under bias and for real-time data acquisition [15] .
A. Chip Preparation
The molding compound above the TrueNorth chip ( Fig. 3 ) had to be removed to reduce the range necessary for the ions to reach the sensitive area. A picture of the exposed chip is shown in Fig. 1 .
B. Ion Selection
As previously mentioned above, the active region of the TrueNorth chip is approximately 10 µm of back end of line materials. As a result, the incident ion must have sufficient range to reach the sensitive volume to produce a single event effect (SEE) within the chip. Stopping and range of ions in matter (SRIM) was used to calculate the minimum energy required to pass through the back end of line materials for various ions [16] . Protons were found to have sufficient range for SEE testing, while heavier ions were found to not have enough range at the maximum Pelletron energy.
C. Testing Setup
The radiation tests were conducted at Vanderbilt University using the Pelletron. The proton energy selected was 4 MeV, and at that energy, the possible proton fluxes range from 10 5 to 10 10 protons/cm 2 -s [15] . The TrueNorth board ( Fig. 1 ) allowed for trained corelets to be uploaded via scripts from a computer. During irradiation, the board was mounted in the Pelletron's vacuum chamber, and an Ethernet feed-through from the chamber was connected to the board.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. Preirradiation Accuracy
The accuracy of preirradiation runs on the 10 000 digit MNIST test set using a pretrained, fixed network (corelet) is 98.82%, which corresponds to 118 errors of the 10 000 digits classified. This is the baseline classification accuracy. Since TrueNorth operation is repeatable, all runs without radiation yield this exact accuracy. (Note these errors are not due to radiation, but rather the inherent nature of a finite, imperfect training set and occasionally ambiguous, sloppily handwritten digits.) A sample of some digits classified by the trained corelet is shown in Fig. 5 . The green boxes in the figure represent correct classifications. The red box is an example of an incorrect classification, which can also be called a critical error since this is a change in the output. The red box shows an example of a "9"; however, the trained corelet incorrectly classifies this digit as a "4" preirradiation. 
B. Postirradiation Accuracy
In previous research on similar architectures emulated using FPGAs and software, parts were irradiated to a certain fluence, and the total number of errors was determined [5] . A similar experiment was run using the TrueNorth architecture. Multiple exposures were performed with fluences up to 5.6 × 10 7 cm −2 followed by determination of the overall classification accuracy. Between runs, the chip was reprogrammed and verified to consistently exhibit preirradiation performance, including across classes of classification. The results of the collection of runs from this experiment are shown in Fig. 6 , where the total number of classification errors after irradiation is shown as a function of fluence. Radiation produces faults and in turn these faults can produce either errors or corrections in the subsequent classifications. One single event could result in one, multiple, or no errors in classification. The total number of errors in Fig. 6 are not only due to the configuration and evaluation of the corelet, but also dependent on the number of images classified. To allow comparison between runs, the number of images classified was always 10 000.
The accuracy remains about the same after irradiation with only small variations with respect to the baseline. For the nine runs in Fig. 6 , the mean is 116 errors and the percent standard deviation 5%. The figure shows that the classification accuracy Example of how changes can occur due to radiation without affecting the overall classification accuracy. The left side is the preirradiation classification of the digits 6-9, and the right side is the same digits after irradiation to a fluence of 5.6 × 10 7 cm −2 .
is constant up to the fluences tested. Therefore, the cross section for classification errors is zero within the statistics of the experiment.
C. Mechanisms
The errors resulting from irradiation are not permanent; they are soft errors. Reloading the model file returns TrueNorth to the original, preirradiation state. In addition, classification of a set of postirradiation data resulted in the identical classification each time. TrueNorth's classification of the data was repeatable. As long as new errors were not introduced via irradiation, the resulting classification of all 10 000 digits remained the same each time. This is consistent with fault injection simulations on this architecture [8] and the expectation that the observed effects are the result of single-event upsets (SEUs) in the SRAM.
The classification changes resulting from radiation occur due to single events, not total ionizing dose. For one, reloading the model file returns TrueNorth to its original, preirradiation state and classification. Additionally, the dose accumulated over all the exposures to the TrueNorth chip was found to be less than 1 krad (SiO 2 ). This provides further evidence that SEEs, not total ionizing dose, are causing the changes in classification.
D. Critical Errors: Classifications Changed by Radiation
Even though radiation did not significantly alter the total number of classification errors, some of the output classifications changed due to proton-induced soft errors, with the number of changes increasing with fluence. Fig. 7 shows a pictorial example of how both can occur simultaneously. The top row shows the handwritten digits 6-9 that are input into the trained corelet for classification. The bottom row shows the classification resulting from the corelet. The left side of the image shows the preirradiation results and the right side shows the results after irradiation to a proton fluence of 5.6 × 10 7 cm −2 . Green boxes signify when the classification was correct, while red corresponds to an incorrect classification. In this simplistic example, the classification accuracy both before and after irradiation is 75%. However, when comparing the outputs from the two classifications, there were actually two changes in classification. The "8" that was originally classified as a "5" was corrected, while the "7" (originally classified correctly) was incorrectly classified as a "3" after irradiation. So while the overall classification accuracy remained the same before and after irradiation (75%), there were actually two changes in classification resulting from radiation. Fig. 9 . Example of a digit classification changing due to irradiation, but still being incorrectly classified. Preirradiation (left), the 5 is incorrectly classified as a 9, and then after irradiation to a fluence of 5.6 × 10 7 cm −2 , the same digit is incorrectly classified as a 3 (right).
Using this technique of comparing the results of the preirradiation to the postirradiation classification, Fig. 8 is generated. Note that the data in Fig. 8 are from the same experiments as the ones conducted for Fig. 6 ; the data are just processed differently here. Fig. 8 shows the number of changes in classification compared to preirradiation as a function of fluence, where zero changes correspond to the preirradiation classifications. As fluence increases (corresponding to an increased number of soft errors in the SRAM), the number of classification changes increases. As was done for the data in Fig. 6 , the data in Fig. 8 were used to calculate the cross section for classification changes per image along with its standard deviation. The cross section per image was found to be 1.4 × 10 −10 cm 2 with a standard deviation of 4.9 × 10 −11 cm 2 . Since the cross section per image is positive and greater than the standard deviation, the data in Fig. 8 show that the number of classification changes increases with fluence.
As demonstrated before, there is approximately the same number of classification corrections (like "8" in Fig. 7) as incorrect classifications due to soft errors (like "7" in Fig. 7 ). In addition, there are some instances where an incorrect classification is not corrected, but the resulting output changes. An example of this is shown in Fig. 9 . Low confidence classifications were most susceptible to classification changes after irradiation.
E. Tolerable Errors: Output Neuron Magnitudes Changed by Radiation
As previously mentioned, the output neuron magnitudes of the trained corelet determine the resulting classification of an image, and these values are stored in the SRAM. There are 10 000 MNIST images being classified per run and each image has 10 output neuron magnitudes, so there are a total of 100 000 output neuron magnitudes per run. Because the output neuron magnitudes are not the final output, changes to these output neuron magnitudes are considered to be tolerable errors.
After irradiation to a fluence of 2.6 × 10 7 cm −2 , 29% of the 100 000 output neuron magnitudes had changed due to SEUs in the SRAM. In number of neuron magnitude changes per fluence, this is equivalent to 1.1 × 10 −3 cm 2 . However, despite the large percentage of changes in output neuron magnitudes, there were still only 118 classification errors (98.82% accuracy), which is the same total number of errors preirradiation. Analysis showed 39 classification changes between the preirradiation and postirradiation data, but for every classification error due to radiation, there was a correction. Of the 39 changes after radiation, 17 of the changes resulted in classification errors, 17 were classification corrections, and the remaining 5 were classifications that were incorrect both before and after irradiation.
In order to cause a change in classification, the value of one output neuron magnitude must overcome the output neuron magnitude of the preirradiation classification. Fig. 10 shows the output neuron magnitude changes due to radiation that resulted in the 17 classification errors while Fig. 11 shows the 17 classification corrections. In both figures, the x-axis is the output neuron magnitude. The changes in output neuron magnitudes are represented by arrows. The start of the arrow corresponds to the value of the preirradiation output neuron magnitude, and the termination of the arrow corresponds to the postirradiation value of the output neuron magnitude. The pairing of a red and black arrow represents the output neuron magnitudes for a single image. The red, dashed arrow represents the output neuron magnitudes for the incorrect classification. Conversely, the black, solid arrow corresponds to the output neuron magnitudes of the correct classification. Black digits are the values of the correct classification while red digits are the values of the incorrect classification.
Since the value of the output neuron magnitude indicates the correlation between the output neuron magnitude's digit and the input image, output neuron magnitudes on the right side of the graph indicate high confidence in the resulting classification, while those on the left suggest low confidence. If high confidence is considered to be output neuron magnitudes with values greater than 0.95, then 93% of preirradiation classifications on the 10 000 images set were found to be high confidence. In addition, of these high confidence classifications, 73% of them had an output neuron magnitude value of exactly 1. Figs. 10 and 11 show that the classification errors due to irradiation resulted from output neuron magnitudes which are not classified as high confidence. None of the classification changes resulted from high confidence output neuron magnitudes, and only seven of the classification changes resulted from preirradiation output neuron magnitudes above 0.8. Fig. 10 . Output neuron magnitudes for 17 classification errors resulting from radiation. Black arrows and digits correspond to the correct classification while red arrows and digits correspond to the incorrect classification. The beginning of the arrow is the output neuron magnitude preirradiation and the termination of the arrow is the postirradiation output neuron magnitude.
VII. SPECIFIC CLASSES
In addition to analyzing the overall errors and classification changes, the effect of soft errors in the SRAM on specific digits is analyzed. There are two ways of looking at every classification error that occurs. Fig. 12 shows a sample string of inputs to the corelet and the corresponding output classification. As seen in the figure, there is a single error, the "8" being incorrectly classified as a "5." The "8" is an example of a false negative, where a false negative is not classifying the input correctly. On the other hand, the "5" is a false positive, which is an indication of an incorrect result. In other words, false negative corresponds to the input that is incorrectly classified, while false positive corresponds to the erroneous output. While a false negative is the incorrectly identified digit (the "8" in Fig. 12 ), a false positive is the classification of a digit that is not actually there (the "5" in Fig. 12 ).
Here are false positives and false negatives in a more general context. A false positive is falsely alerting to something, or "crying wolf." On the other hand, a false negative is not alerting to something that it should. This means that something slips by and is "invisible" to the classification system. Both of these situations could be undesirable. For example, say that classifying something as X causes alarm. On one hand, every false positive for X produces unnecessary alarm since X did not really occur. On the other hand, every false negative for X means that there is no alarm when there rightfully should Fig. 11 . Output neuron magnitudes for 17 classification corrections resulting from radiation. Black arrows and digits correspond to the correct classification while red arrows and digits correspond to the incorrect classification. The beginning of the arrow is the output neuron magnitude preirradiation and the termination of the arrow is the postirradiation output neuron magnitude. be, because X did occur even though the classification system did not classify it as such.
A. Preirradiation
Analyzing the preirradiation data to look at the false positives and negatives of specific digits results in Fig. 13 .
In addition, the figure shows an example of an error and how the false positive and negative relates to the table. Looking at the yellow box, that there are 9 instances that an "8" is incorrectly classified. For reference, there are approximately 1000 examples of the digit "8." On the other hand, there are 10 cases where the number input to the corelet is classified as a "0" when some other digit is actually input into the system. Since false negatives and false positives each represent a different way of looking at one error, the sum of the false-negative column is equal to the sum of the false positive column. These two sums are both 118, which is to be expected since that is the total number of errors in the system preirradiation. It can also be seen from the table in Fig. 13 that there is a bias toward certain numbers. Of the ten digits, "0" has the lowest false-negative classification rate. Of the approximately 1000 examples of "0" input into the system, only 2 were classified as something else. On the other hand, "4" has the highest instance of classification errors as shown by 29 false negatives. As far as false positives (the incorrect output classifications) go, "4" has only 5 instances, meaning that there are only five times that some input is incorrectly classified as a "4." In this case, there is a bias against classifying "4"s, since "4" has a high number of missed classifications (false negatives) and a low number of incorrect classifications (false positives). There is a bias toward classifying numbers as "0," indicated by the low number of false negatives and moderate number of false positives. These observations may depend on the training data set.
B. Postirradiation
The effect of radiation on the number of classification errors for specific digits is analyzed next. Figs. 14 and 15 show how the number of false positives changes with fluence for Fig. 15 . As fluence increases, the number of false positives for the digit "6" increases. "0" and "6," respectively. As the fluence increases for the digit "0," the number of false positives decreases. The trend is negative which indicates improvements in the network for "0"s. On the other hand, the number of false positives for "6" increases with fluence. This is similarly supported by the calculation of the mean and standard deviation ( Fig. 15 inset) , where the mean is positive and greater than the standard deviation.
Taking all the false positive and false negative data from Figs. 14 and 15 and combining them into a histogram results in Fig. 16. Fig. 16 has the false positives at the top half of the y-axis and the false negatives going down the lower half of the axis. The preirradiation data sets are the yellow bars, while the blue bars are the postirradiation data. The positive x-direction corresponds to increasing fluence within each digit's data set.
This figure allows comparison between digits and also analysis of trends within a specific digit. The digit with the highest occurrence of false positives is "9," meaning that there are more incorrect outputs that are "9"s than any other digit. The highest number of false negatives belongs to the digit "4," meaning that the "4"s input into the system are the most often incorrectly classified digit. The number of false positives for "0" and "5" decreases with fluence, while it increases for "2," "4," and "6." On the other hand, the number of false negatives increases with fluence for the digits "2" and "8."
VIII. CONCLUSION
Both overall classification accuracy and individual digit classification accuracy were analyzed in this work. The classification accuracy before irradiation was 98.82%. Introducing soft errors by proton irradiation up to fluences of 5.6 × 10 7 cm −2 did not significantly affect this accuracy with only a 5% standard deviation from the mean. Although the accuracy stayed approximately constant, radiation did cause an increasing number of changes between the preirradiation and postirradiation classification. In addition, when analyzing individual digits, soft errors caused changes to the classification accuracy of particular digits. Some digits had a decrease in errors as fluence increases, while others had an increase in errors with fluence. Whereas the overall classification accuracy remained the same, SEUs caused changes within specific classes.
The results of this experiment can be applied more generally to neuromorphic architectures. In the data presented here, the overall classification accuracy remained constant after introducing errors in the SRAM by proton irradiation; however, changes occurred within the specific digits. In neuromorphic computing architectures, it may be necessary to examine the radiation-induced changes of the weak classifications and their effect on the classification accuracy of specific classes. In this work, the accuracy did not measurably change. However, for some classes, the number of errors more than tripled after radiation. These radiation effects were only revealed through more in-depth analysis of the occurrence of individual errors.
